

D/NIO Chrono - February 1976 (Con't)

- |     |           |  |  |
|-----|-----------|--|--|
| 34. | 26 Feb 76 | The National Intelligence Production Problem (Draft) for the DCI | Enno Knoche, AD/DCI/IC<br>D/OSR<br>D/OCI |
| 35. | 26 Feb 76 | Expanded outline of Soviet civil defense study                   | Dr. Edward Teller<br>cc: Wheaton Byers   |

TREA has not  
reviewed. Processed  
IAW CIA TREA  
arrangement letter dtd  
4/11/08.

NRO review(s)  
completed.

CRC, 2/14/2003

D/NIO CHRONO - FEBRUARY 1976 (Con't)

17.	10 Feb 76	Economic Estimates	NIO/E, USSR, ME, JP, WE
18.	11 Feb 76	Structural Changes and Institutional Reforms	Director
19.	11 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 30px; width: 100%;"></div> 25X1	
20.	11 Feb 76	Senate Select Committee Req Regarding KIQ Strategy Reports and Narrative Performance Evals.	Director
21.	12 Feb 76	The DCI's Immediate Office	NIOs, PP, and RI
22.	12 Feb 76	Note to <div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	25X1
23.	17 Feb 76	Intelligence Support for General Haig	RAdmiral Holcomb
24.	17 Feb 76	Secretary Simon's 4 Feb Letter	Director
25.	17 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div> 25X1	
26.	17 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 50px; height: 20px;"></div> Support for General Haig	D/OCI via DDI 25X1
27.	20 Feb 76	Thank you for note on Soviet Foreign Policy	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 30px;"></div>
28.	20 Feb 76	FOIA Appeal for Cuban Documents <div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	NIO/LA 25X1
29.	20 Feb 76	Intelligence Support for General Haig	RAdmiral Holcomb 25X1
30.	20 Feb 76	Senate Select Committee Request	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div> Chairman, Review Staff
31.	23 Feb 76	Charts used by SecDef at Cabinet Mtg on 20 Feb	NIO/SP
32.	23 Feb 76	Use of the Director of Central Intelligence's "State of the World Check-list"	Lt.Gen Elmer T. Brooks O/SecDef
33.	24 Feb 76	Joint Cong. Committee on Atomic Energy Briefing given by DCI on 19 Feb.	Hon. Donald Cotter Asst/SecDef/Atomic Energy

D/NIO Chrono - February 1976

1.	2 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	General Tighe	25X1
2.	2 Feb 76	Req for the date of the first "Wise Men" Mtg	Ambassador Helms	
3.	2 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 600px; height: 20px;"></div>		25X1
4.	2 Feb 76	Thank you <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	General Tighe, A/D/	25X1
5.	2 Feb 76	Two Special Projects of the Former Office of the DCI's Special Asst. for Vietn. Affairs	Director	
6.	2 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 550px; height: 80px;"></div>		25X1
7.	2 Feb 76			
8.	4 Feb 76	Senator Pell's Request	DCI	
9.	5 Feb 76	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand	DCI	
10.	5 Feb 76	The 4 Feb Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand	Parmenter, D/OCI	
11.	5 Feb 76	Thanks for help on IIM-Thailand	Hal Saunders, D/INR	
12.	5 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 350px; height: 40px;"></div>	Director, DDCI, D/	25X1
			DDI DDO	
13.	6 Feb 76	Intelligence Support for General Haig	General Wickham	
14.	7 Feb 76	Electronic Warfare	General Tighe, AD/DIA	
15.	9 Feb 76	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 20px;"></div>	Peter Rodman in office	25X1
16.	10 Feb 76	General Tighe's Request	DCI, DDCI, EA/DCI, DDI, OSR, DDS&T, D/IC	

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 February 1976

Dr. Edward Teller  
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory  
University of California  
Box 808  
Livermore, California 94550

Dear Dr. Teller:

Per our conversation in Washington, attached is an expanded outline of the Soviet civil defense study as the latter is presently conceived. This outline will indicate the problems we consider important and the way we plan to address them.

It would be most helpful if you could take the time to read this prospectus with some care and then give us the benefit of your reactions to and comments on it. The subject is one of enormous importance, for several reasons, and we want to make this look at the problem as thorough and comprehensive as possible.

With many thanks for your help and with warmest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

GACarver, Jr.:kes

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att (outline only--did not send memo fr  
25X1 [redacted] to IWG on Soviet Civil Defense)

- 1 - NIO/SP w/o att
- 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/att
- 1 - NIO/RI w/o att

25X1

SECRET

NO # 0324-76

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 29/76  
25 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Interagency Working Group on  
Soviet Civil Defense

SUBJECT : Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum  
on Soviet Civil Defense

REFERENCE : Memorandum (same subject), SP-16/76, dated 6 February 1976

1. The referenced memorandum established a working group to prepare an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Civil Defense. At the first meeting of the working group on 17 February 1976, an outline of the memorandum and agency responsibilities for preparing major parts of the paper were agreed upon. It was also agreed that the chairman of the working group in collaboration with the NIO for Strategic Programs would prepare an expanded outline of the paper, indicating agency responsibilities (attachment 1) and a work schedule based on a completion date for the project of 1 June 1976 (attachment 2).

2. In preparing the expanded outline, it became obvious that background papers would be required to assist the agencies responsible for drafting the several parts of the study. At least some of the background papers identified in attachment 3 should become annexes to the main report.

3. The significance of Soviet civil defense to high level US officials requires that participating agencies make a vigorous effort on this project. The extent of research by contributing agencies will be limited, however, by the need to meet the work schedule for completion of the paper. Even with our best efforts, the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum will be a status report of what we know and do not know about the subject; it will be a baseline for further intelligence collection and analysis.

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25X1

-2-

SP - 29/76

SUBJECT: Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on  
Soviet Civil Defense

4. The chairman of the working group for preparation of the memorandum is [redacted] At the second 25X1  
meeting of the working group, the members should be prepared to commit their  
agencies to the proposed work program and schedule. The second meeting will  
be held at CIA Headquarters at 0930, 1 March 1976, Room 7-E-62. Please pass  
the names of participants to [redacted] [redacted] 25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer  
for Strategic Programs

Attachments  
As Stated

SECRET

SP - 29/76

SUBJECT: Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum  
on Soviet Civil Defense

Distribution:

D/DCI/NIO

NIO/SP

NIO/RI

IC Staff

D/NPIC

25X1

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NIO/SP: (25Feb76)

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ATTACHMENT 2

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Soviet Civil Defense

WORK SCHEDULE

1 March	Working group meeting to finalize work program.
7 April	Distribution of background papers to the working group.
14 April	Agency comments in writing to originators of background papers.
21 April	Distribution of sections of the memorandum to the working group.
30 April	Distribution of the chairman's first rough draft of the paper to members of the working group.
7 May	Distribution of the first draft of the memorandum for agency comments.
14 May	Working group meeting to review first draft. To speed the process of review, proposed substantive changes should be in written form for distribution at the meeting.
21 May	Distribution of final (second) draft, with key judgments and summary for agency approval.
27 May	Working group meeting for clean-up of final draft.
1 June	DCI approval for publication.

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Graphics: Proposed graphics for the background paper (annexes) and the main body of the memorandum should be submitted to the chairman as soon as possible. Graphics may be rough layouts but they should have a title, an explanatory caption and should be properly classified. Photographs should be marked with appropriate annotations.

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Wheaton Byers  
 Executive Officer  
 President's Foreign Intelligence  
 Advisory Board


Wheaton:

Attached is a self-explanatory note to Dr. Teller. Would you please be good enough to see that it is sent to him via some appropriate channel sufficiently secure to accommodate this material.

Many thanks.

 25X1  
 George A. Carver, Jr.  
 D/DCI/NIO

Date 27 February 1976

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE 25 Feb 76
TO: D/DCI/NIO		 25X1
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:  The attached memorandum lays out the Soviet Civil Defense paper in more detail than the original outline. This is an ambitious project with a tight schedule.  <p style="text-align: center;">Ray</p>		
FROM: NIO/SP		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
 1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Enno H. Knoche  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence  
Community

Mr. Richard Lehman  
Director of Strategic Research


SUBJECT : The National Intelligence Production Problem

Hank and Dick:

Attached is the draft of a memorandum which outlines and amplifies in writing some of the points I tried to convey orally at our 25 February session with the Director. I would welcome any comments or reactions either of you might care to offer.

I know that each of you will not agree with several of my prescriptive recommendations (though I suspect that your respective objections will not be directed at the same recommendations or based on the same arguments). I am not soliciting agreement or consensus, but would appreciate it very much if you would flag any comments which either of you see as containing factual errors.

25X1

  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

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Approved For Release 2008/06/19 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter  
Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : The National Intelligence Production Problem

Bill:

Per our 25 February telephone conversation, attached is a draft of a memorandum outlining my thoughts on an approach to the problem of national production. I would welcome your comments and reactions and, particularly, your flagging any factual errors -- particularly in those portions of the memorandum which discuss matters for which you bear the primary responsibility.

 25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

 25X1

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Approved For Release 2008/06/19 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9

0321-76

National Intelligence Officers


24 February 1976

Honorable Donald R. Cotter  
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
for Atomic Energy  
Room 3D1074  
The Pentagon

Dear Don:

Per our conversation on Friday,  
20 February, I am forwarding for your  
information a copy of the text of Mr. Bush's  
briefing to the Joint Congressional  
Committee on Atomic Energy on 19 February.  
Also attached is the longer version of the  
briefing, copies of which were provided  
to the Committee in advance of Mr. Bush's  
presentation.

25X1

  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

25X1

 NIO/SP:kes

Distribution

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1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts  
1 - NIO/RI w/o atts

✓ D/NIO Chrono w/o atts  
Only original w/atts (NIO/SP)

23 February 1976

NOTE FOR: NIO/SP



Attached is a set of charts used by the Secretary of Defense at a Cabinet meeting on Friday, 20 February.

At the DCI's request, would you please arrange for the proper people to examine all of these figures and see if they are in general accord with the figures currently being used in national intelligence production. If any of them are not -- i.e., are at significant variance with comparable figures the Intelligence Community is using -- please identify these areas of disagreement.

After these checks have been run, please prepare a short note to Bill Hyland for the DCI's signature either asserting that the Secretary of Defense's figures are in substantial conformity with those of the Intelligence Community or explaining any areas of material difference.



25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

31  
25X1

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

23 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant Colonel Elmer T. Brooks, USAF  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Use of the Director of Central Intelligence's  
"State of the World Check-list"

1. In response to your query, I had each of the NIOs review those portions of the DCI's "State of the World Check-list" for which he (or she) was the principal drafter. As I suspected would prove to be the case, this review indicates that the Secretary can feel quite free to draw on this document in the preparation of his own speeches or statements, even unclassified ones. Much of the material and the judgements contained in the checklist was, of course, derived from classified data (some of it very highly classified), but the actual language of the document itself is sufficiently general so that drawing on it would not jeopardize intelligence sources and methods --

[REDACTED]

2. You will naturally appreciate that it would not be desirable to identify these judgments or the language in which they are couched as coming from a report prepared by the DCI for the President. It will also be self-evident that the footnotes giving specific references to classified studies should not be cited in any document put in the public domain.

3. Some of the statements, while they reveal no particular sources or methods, are clearly politically sensitive and would have a certain political impact if used in public statements by cabinet-level U.S. officials. These are fairly obvious. One example is paragraph 12; for the Yugoslavs are quite touchy about any discussion of Tito's possible death. Another, is the characterization of Teng Hsiao-ping in the first paragraph of

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the China section (which happens to come right after the paragraph on Tito).

4. With the above exceptions, we see no difficulties with the Secretary's drawing on the checklist in any way he finds helpful and are pleased that he found the document of some interest and value.



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George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

GACarver, Jr./kes

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - SA/DCI
- ✓ 1 - D/NIO Chrono
- 1 - PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
- 1 - NIO/RI

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20 February 1976

30

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. [REDACTED] 25X1  
Chairman, Review Staff

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee Request

1. Attached for your information is a copy of Mr. Miller's 18 February letter to me, which I received during the afternoon of the 19th and discussed at the Executive Committee meeting on 20 February. Also attached is Bill Bader's letter of 12 January, which started this ball rolling, and [REDACTED] 14 January 25X1 note to me commenting on Bader's 12 January letter.

2. Over the last month, we have had several discussions with Lynn Davis and Beth Blumfield on this matter. The SSC Staff is convinced it has a hard case of Helms trimming his substantive sails and suppressing analysts' truths which he felt would be unpalatable at the White House. I think this interpretation is nonsense. Helms made a judgment call which seemed right at the time and which I think it is pointless to peck over in hindsight. As I have tried to point out to the staff (with no great degree of apparent success), they are taking two documents out of the context of the totality of the Agency's production during the period. So far as I am concerned, the Agency's track record in delivering unpalatable truths about Vietnam to the White House more than speaks for itself and reflects considerable credit on both the Agency and the DCI. This, however, is not a line of reasoning the SSC Staff finds particularly congenial and they apparently prefer to be selective in their critical focus.

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3. I plan to take no action on responding to this letter pending the DCI's directions. He, in turn, will probably not want to make a decision until you have obtained some clarification of what is involved.



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
George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

cc: Mr.  25X1  
Mr.  
Ms.

GACarver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO:kes

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/atts  
cys - as indicated above w/atts  
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/atts ✓  
1 - SSC File w/atts (*already in file*)  
1 - NIO/RI w/o atts  
25X1 1 -  , *DCI (2/24)*

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25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : Comments on Attached Letter  
(Dated 12 January 1976)

1. In general, most of the points in the attached letter are accurate, but they tend to gloss over some of the important nuances in the situation.

- the spring, 1970 memorandum was on "prospects", not "political prospects" -- a minor point.
- as memory serves (and I do not have a copy of the memorandum), the point made in the memorandum on military intervention into Cambodia was not that it would not significantly affect the ability of the communists to expand their control in Cambodia. Instead, the point was that for such a military action to have great impact would probably require a large force to be committed and to be sustained for a considerable length of time.
- the memorandum never said that a US military incursion would fail.
- by the time the memorandum hit the DCI's desk, it was practically the eve of the US military action; the publication of the memorandum would have inevitably appeared to have been "writing for the record" -- the decision had already been made.

2. The remarks in the letter concerning the draft estimate on the results of the US incursion into Cambodia are correct. Even so, it should be pointed out that between the time of the draft and the decision not to proceed with it several factors were pertinent.

- the conditions surrounding the incursion changed, i.e., the operation was terminated at the end of June.
- with the operation terminated, it did not make much sense to rush into print with what had to be incomplete data -- information on the results and -- more important -- on their impact were still coming in. Moreover, the key question then became that of "impact", and it was too early to offer anything but very tentative judgments on this score.

25X1

A/NIO/SSEAAF

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

20 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, USN  
Military Assistant to the Secretary of  
Defense

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support for General Haig

Forwarded herewith for your perusal and information is a further set of the cables sent [ ] in support of General Haig. Please return these and future messages to my office after they have served your purposes. Please note that there is no cable for Monday, 16 February, due to the holiday.

[ ]  
25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

[ ]  
25X1

Package transmitted under [ ] 25X1

O/DCI/NIO: [ ] 25X1

Distribution

Orig - Addressee w/atts  
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts ✓  
1 - HAIG SUPPORT FILE w/o atts  
1 - NIO/RI w/o atts

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25X1

TOP SECRET [ ]

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 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers


20 February 1976


27

 25X1

Dear 

25X1

Thanks for your note of February 6, forwarding  comments on Soviet foreign policy. 25X1


As you are aware,  is highly regarded for his experienced and shrewd perceptions of the Soviet scene. This piece strikes a particularly responsive chord here. We too see the long-term Soviet policy horizon -- the favorably changing correlation of forces -- somewhat blurred by such intractable difficulties as agricultural productivity, effective leadership of the disparate gaggle that passes these days to the "World Communist Movement," and translating Western difficulties into specific Soviet policy gains. 25X1

Sincerely yours,


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George A/ Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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Distribution:

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1 - A/NIO/USSR  
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1 - NIO/RI

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NIO # 0268-76

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter  
Director of Current Intelligence

THROUGH : Mr. Edward W. Proctor  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT :  Support for General Haig

25X1

Attached for your information and retention is a  
Quarterly Report (September-December 1975) from

This report, along with  
earlier correspondence, confirms the value and efficacy of  
the  effort. On several occasions, General Haig has  
personally indicated his appreciation for and the importance  
he attaches to the material and analyses that he receives  
from  He clearly holds them in  
high regard for the professional manner in which they have  
discharged their duties in support of him.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

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:kes

25X1

- Original - Addressee w/att
- 1 - DDI w/att
  - 1 - HAIG SUPPORT w/att
  - 1 - D/NIO chrono w/o att ✓
  - 1 - NIO/RI w/o att
  - 1 - DOC Chrono w/o att

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17 February 1976

25

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP  
NIO/CH  
NIO/SSEAF

SUBJECT : Formal Request on [REDACTED] 25X1

Attached is a note from [REDACTED] which is 25X1  
essentially the same as the intra-ICS memorandum for-  
warded to you on 11 February. We will caucus on this  
subject after you have had a chance to sort out your  
thoughts on the problem.

[REDACTED]

25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

Attachment

[REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

**Page Denied**

ational Intelligence Officers

17 February 1976

DTE FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Secretary Simon's 4 February  
Letter

Attached for your signature is a proposed  
response to Secretary Simon's letter of  
February (which we received on  
10 February). Also attached is a copy of  
that letter, plus the 5 February note by  
which Bill Morell forwarded it to you.

Morell actually drafted Simon's letter  
and Morell's text, in turn, was based on  
conversations with [ ] and  
[ ] who drafted your proposed  
reply. In this exercise, therefore, there  
is a certain amount of circularity, but  
this response will keep the record straight  
and clear your books.

[ ]  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

25X1

25X1

25X1

Copy of whole package will be returned  
upon DCI's signature.  
GACarver, Jr.:kes  
f - D/NIO Chrono  
cy NIO/E

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, USN  
Military Assistant to the Secretary  
of Defense

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support for General Haig

Forwarded herewith for your perusal and information  
is a further set of the cables sent [REDACTED] in support of  
General Haig. Please return these and future messages to my  
office after they have served your purposes.

23  
25X1

[REDACTED]  
25X1

George W. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

25X1

Pa

O/D/DCI/NIO: [REDACTED] 25X1

Distribution

Orig - Addressee w/atts 25X1

1 - [REDACTED] Chrono w/o atts

1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts ✓

1 - HAIG SUPPORT file w/o atts

1 - NIO/RI w/o atts

[REDACTED]  
25X1

[REDACTED]  
25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

February 12, 1976

Dear Barbara,

Having been an admirer of yours for many years, I am delighted to have an opportunity to add this note to the compendium. Your contributions to the work of this Agency have been legion; and your assistance to a succession of its senior officers, indispensable. Your poise, efficiency, tact, loyalty and unfailing good judgment have been -- quite literally -- invaluable during the past series of hectic, stressful months. All of us are deeply in your debt, not only for helping make Bill's office run so smoothly during an impossible time, but also for being so helpful to the rest of us who needed to work directly with him during this era -- and for continuously giving us all a lift by your company, humor, charm and great contribution to the aesthetics of his office as well as its efficiency. I wish you well in your new duties, which I know you will discharge with stellar distinction, and look forward not only to seeing the range of your contributions steadily increase, but also to the pleasure of working with you as they do.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,



25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.



*D/500*

12 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs, PP and RI

SUBJECT : The DCI's Immediate Office

Attached for your information is a note from Mr. Evans which briefly delineates the responsibilities of the DCI's two assistants --  and

Please note the change in title for and ensure that all correspondence to him carries the proper designator -- SA/DCI vice EA/DCI.

UNCODED

*Signed*

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

ES 76-1

11 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : Organization of the DCI's Immediate Office

1. The Director will be assisted by an Executive Assistant [redacted] and a Special Assistant [redacted]. Their respective duties are generally as follows: 25X1

a. [redacted] (EA/DCI). The Director will look to her for the organization of his day, to include confirmation of requests for appointments, as well as being the officer who will set into motion travel plans and monitor arrangements related to same. She will have particular responsibility for assistance to the Director with regard to Congressional, journalist, and social/personal contacts. She will also undertake special projects for the Director. 25X1

b. [redacted] (SA/DCI). He will assist the Director with regard to substantive intelligence production and operational matters. He will be responsible for checking the completeness of materials assembled for various meetings the DCI is to attend such as the 40 Committee, SRG, PFIAB, etc. He will also have a particular responsibility for seeing that briefing materials are developed in support of DCI appointments. Additionally, he will screen intelligence publications and operational cables. 25X1

2. The Director will be supported by two Secretary-Stenos [redacted] who will handle the telephones for the Director as well as for the EA/DCI and SA/DCI. It is contemplated that in the future the latter will have his own Secretary-Steno. 25X1

3. The functions of the Executive Secretariat remain as described in HN 1-99. As most of you know, [redacted] has joined us as my Deputy. 25X1 25X1

[redacted]  
B. C. Evans  
Executive Secretary

ADMINISTRATIVE—INTERNAL USE ONLY

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Approved For Release 2008/06/19 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 72-26

7C

11 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee Request Regarding  
KIQ Strategy Reports and Narrative  
Performance Evaluations

1. I believe you have received at least some briefings on your predecessor's Key Intelligence Question mechanism, which was designed to focus the Community's efforts on issues of major importance to our policy-level consumers. This KIQ approach was tried on a pilot basis in FY 1974 and attempted for real in FY 1975. In brief, at the beginning of the fiscal year the NIOs prepare a list of Key Intelligence Questions (69 in the FY 1975 list), which are developed in concert with concerned elements of the Community, discussed by the USIB and then issued by the DCI. On each Question, the NIO within whose area of responsibility it falls then caucusses with the appropriate collection and production managers throughout the Community and develops something called a Strategy Report, designed as a vehicle for identifying who can and will do what in an effort to answer (or try to answer) that Question. After the end of the fiscal year, all the KIQs and the Community's performance on them are subjected to something called the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP), the first part of which entails having the NIOs write a narrative assessment of the Community's overall performance with respect to each KIQ.

2. From virtually the moment of its inception, the Senate Select Committee and -- especially -- that Committee's staff have evinced a great and continuing interest in the KIQ/KEP Process. In August, the Staff Director (Bill Miller) asked that the Committee be provided

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loan copies of the FY 1975 KIQs and the Strategy Reports for five of these KIQs:

- #7 Accuracy of new Soviet ICBMs
- #22 Warsaw Pact defense budgets
- #30 Prospects in Yugoslavia after Tito



25X1

These requested items were forwarded to Mr. Miller and his staff associates via  on 21 August. 25X1

3. On 12 January 1976, Mrs. Lynn Davis of the Senate Select Committee Staff asked to see the NIOs' narrative evaluation assessments of the Community's performance on the above five FY 1975 KIQs. Bill Colby refused to provide these documents on the grounds that they were internal working drafts and part of an internal evaluation process still in train. (Furthermore, at the time the request was first levied, Bill himself had not had a chance to read these evaluation reports and he was more than a trifle irritated at being asked to provide internal documents which he himself had not seen for SSC inspection.)

4. Last week, Bill Bader -- a senior member of the SSC Staff -- called to repeat the request for these five evaluation reports. Specifically, he wanted to know if you would be willing to reverse Colby's decision.

5. There are several sets of equities involved here, including your own determination of the general posture you want to take with the SSC and its staff. All other things being equal -- which, in this case, they may well not be -- I think you should let Bill's decision stand. These are candid internal documents and all of your deputies are more than a trifle gun-shy about passing such documents to the Senate or House Select Committees, since on many occasions over the past year our own prose has been used as ammunition in hostile fire publicly directed against us. Also, these reports were folded into an overall evaluation (with numbers purporting to show allocation of

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Community resources to various KIQs), which was a disaster and which Bill himself recalled. I would not want that document to get outside the Executive Branch and am concerned lest these five evaluation reports whet an appetite for the entire package of which they subsequently became a part.

6. Appended for your information is a copy of the complete list of FY 1975 KIQs, the Strategy Reports on the five KIQs in question (which were shown to the SSC Staff), and the five performance reports for which they are asking and which they have not yet been given. As you will see, the performance reports by themselves are not damaging; but the request for them relates to a larger set of issues and our posture on that particular request should be consistent with what you determine ought to be our general posture with respect to these larger issues. I would appreciate a decision as soon as it is convenient for you to make one, since Bader will certainly be querying me again soon and I would like to be able to give him a firm answer -- yes or no -- the next time we talk.

  
25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

#### Attachments

cc: DDCI w/o atts                      D/DCI/IC w/o atts  
Executive Registry w/o atts

#### Distribution

GACarver, Jr./kes

Original - Addressee w/atts  
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BACKGROUND ON KIQ, KSR, KIQ NARRATIVE EVALUATIONS --  
SENATE SELECTIVE COMMITTEE STAFF

Between 15 July and 12 August 1975

Mr. Peter Zimmerman and Miss Beth Blumfield reviewed the "Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975" and the Key Intelligence Questions Strategy Reports for FY 75.

On 8 August 1975

Mr. William Miller requested that the Committee be provided loan copies of the "Key Intelligence Questions - FY 75" and the KIQ Strategy Reports for the following KIQs:

- #7 Accuracy of new Soviet ICBMs
- #22 Warsaw Pact defense budgets
- #30 Prospects in Yugoslavia after Tito

These items were provided [redacted] on 21 August 25X1  
for forwarding to Mr. Miller.

On 12 January 1976

Miss Davis requested access to the NIO narrative evaluation reports for the above five FY 75 KIQs. Mr. Colby said no since these are internal working drafts -- part of the process but not the full evaluation.

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Approved For Release 2008/06/19 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9

*AP/110 Chrono*

*PC*

11 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP  
NIO/CH  
NIO/SSEAF

SUBJECT : Review of Need for [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 Attached is a self-explanatory intra-IC Staff  
note on [REDACTED]. After you have had an opportunity  
25X1 to digest its contents, I would like to discuss it with  
you particularly in light of the study that  
25X6 [REDACTED] completed and USIB reviewed [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and their priorities. 25X6

[REDACTED] 25X1  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

Attachment

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Approved For Release 2008/06/19 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9

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11 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Structural Changes and Institutional Reforms

1. Over the past several months, many have engaged in discussion and thought (often more of the former than the latter) about structural or organizational changes in the intelligence community. The basic decisions may have already been made, hence several of the suggestions outlined below may have been overtaken by events; but I thought you might find these observations of some interest and use.

2. Structure should be keyed to function. The DCI has three major sets of continuing responsibilities -- clearly interrelated, but nonetheless both distinguishable and distinct:

a. Being the Government's senior substantive intelligence officer and advisor.

b. Being the Government's principal advisor on intelligence resources.

c. Managing the CIA.

3. Each of these three sets of responsibilities has its own complexities.

a. Being the fount of national intelligence is clearly the DCI's primary responsibility, since establishing such a fount was clearly the 80th Congress' primary objective in passing Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947.\*

\*What Congress wanted was a mechanism through which all of the information available to the US Government bearing on national security problems (with a foreign dimension) could be collated and evaluated by one central entity, not under the control of any cabinet department or military service.

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-- The primacy of this set of responsibilities is further underlined by the fact that the DCI's other major responsibilities (advising on resource allocation and managing the CIA) really have to do with the mechanisms which enable him to discharge this function of being the Government's principal substantive intelligence officer and fount of national intelligence.

-- The DCI's broader substantive responsibilities logically evolved from this statutory base, including his present responsibilities for providing a broad range of current intelligence reports and assessments and for providing national estimates.

-- The key aspect of this set of responsibilities is the latter's national scope. As applied to intelligence, "national" has come to mean intelligence which draws on all information available to all components of the Government, is assessed by the best analytic talent available throughout the Government, and is presented to the President and his senior advisors with a reflection of significant dissenting judgments where the latter exist and are of material consequence.

-- Over the last year or so there has been a rising amount of debate over the extent of the DCI's responsibility for providing substantive intelligence support to the Congress. This added complexity, however, does not alter his clear obligation to provide support to the President and the NSC, or his primacy as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer.

b. The resource "advisory" role was only implicitly adumbrated in the 1947 Act. It has evolved by pragmatic precedent and was explicitly stated in President Nixon's November 1971 letter. The precise dimensions of that role, however, and the DCI's degree of authority in resource matters are still vague, and disputed (especially in the Department of Defense).

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c. The CIA is an instrument set up to help the DCI discharge the responsibilities with which he was vested by statute.

-- Over time, it was given -- under the DCI's management -- certain other institutional responsibilities, notably the covert collection (espionage) function (a "service of common concern"), the covert action function (one of those "other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" directed by the NSC), and certain responsibilities for the development and management of technical collection programs (ditto).

-- Despite the language of the 1947 and 1949 Acts and the pragmatic precedents of almost three decades, there is still some debate within the Executive Branch -- and within the Intelligence Community -- over what CIA is, and what it is not. In part, this debate is rooted in what may sound to to a layman like a philosophical conundrum: whether there is (or is not) a valid distinction between "national intelligence" and "non-departmental intelligence". CIA's production -- i.e., the published output of the DDI and parts of the DDS&T -- is clearly "non-departmental", since CIA is not under the control of any cabinet department. Many CIA analysts -- and managers -- would and do argue that, ergo, what CIA produces is national intelligence. This contention, however, is by no means universally accepted throughout the rest of the Intelligence Community or the Executive Branch, where it is argued (often stridently) that reports/assessments/appreciations/estimates are not national intelligence unless and until they reflect (and, in some cases, clearly identify) the views of all concerned components of the Intelligence Community, not just those of CIA.

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-- This debate, in turn, is at the root of what some, indeed many (outside CIA), perceive as an inherent conflict of interest in the dual roles of the DCI (as his office is now structured) as the Government's senior substantive intelligence officer (the fount of national intelligence) and -- simultaneously -- the head of one of the Intelligence Community's analytic and production components, i.e., the CIA.

4. In addition to the three sets of continuing responsibilities outlined above, the DCI also has a fourth set of responsibilities which are latent or intermittent: providing intelligence support to national decision-making in times of crisis. These are clearly related to his continuing responsibilities, but have several special features.

-- They bring into sharp focus the ambiguities in the relationship between and responsibilities of (on the one hand) the DCI and (on the other) the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

-- They also bring the complex "national/tactical" question into sharp focus.

-- They give added intensity to the debate over the role and functions of the CIA.

5. The Present Structure. At present, the DCI is supported by a command structure which was developed during the tenure of your two immediate predecessors. It includes:

a. A Deputy DCI -- appointed by the President with the Senate's advice and consent -- who serves as Acting DCI in your absences, is the CIA member of the USIB, performs a variety of special missions and functions, but who (under present arrangements) is not really in the line of command.

b. Two staff Deputies to the DCI who assist him in the discharge of his two -- and it is important to remember that there are two -- sets of community

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responsibilities: substance (the D/DCI/NIO)  
and resources (the D/DCI/IC).

c. Four line Deputies -- DDS&T, DDI, DDO  
and DDA -- through whom the DCI runs the CIA.

6. The present system runs with the grain of the DCI's major responsibilities. It is not bad. Actually, it is fairly good. It does not -- nor can it -- alleviate the problems engendered by the DCI's limited and ambiguous authority (especially in the resource field); but apart from that, it has only one serious flaw: within it there is no overall, day-to-day manager of the CIA, other than the DCI himself. This, in turn,

-- Sets up a great drain on the DCI's time.

-- Compounds the perception of "conflict of interest" between the DCI's Community and Agency roles, noted above.

-- Creates an anomalous and often awkward situation: when the DCI is wearing his "Community" hat adjudicating Community disputes, the CIA has no single advocate to explain and defend its legitimate institutional equities.

7. The flaws in the present structure, however, could be quite easily remedied by either of two approaches:

a. Changing the present concept of the role of the DDCI, charging him with being the day-to-day manager of CIA (and letting him be it), or

b. Re-constituting and perhaps enhancing the now abolished position of Executive Director.

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8. The "Two Deputies" Approach. Another, superficially appealing way to go at the structural problem is to follow the "two deputies" approach: i.e., give the DCI one Deputy DCI to manage the CIA and another to handle the Community. I understand that this is the approach now being favored downtown; but before any final decisions are taken (if they have not already been made), careful consideration ought to be given to the fact that this approach would be likely to create more problems than it solves.

-- This is because the DCI does not have just one set of Community responsibilities, he has two: substance and resources.

-- In solving the "CIA problem" it would compound the "Community problem."

-- If the Community deputy were a civilian (especially a non-Defense Department civilian) there would be great -- and understandable -- concern within the DOD, the JCS and the military services that Defense's resource equities and requirements would not be properly understood or adequately protected.

-- Conversely, if the Community deputy were a serving military officer (or a civilian with a Defense Department background) there would be serious, again understandable, concern -- within other components of the Executive Branch, in the Congress, in the

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public (and, for that matter, within CIA)  
about the objectivity of national  
intelligence production.

-- If the two Community responsibilities -- substance and resources -- are combined under a single deputy, one of them would be bound to suffer. Given the American fascination for the concrete and quantitative -- especially in light of the amounts of money involved -- said single Community deputy would almost inevitably be inclined to focus primarily on resources, which would probably soon come to drive substance. Hence, substance -- i.e., the responsibilities the DCI was primarily set up by statute to discharge -- would almost inevitably suffer.

-- The chances of serious friction between the two deputies would be great. Even in the unlikely event that both were always saints, there would be an inescapable pecking order problem: one would have to be Acting DCI in your absence, and he would be seen throughout the Government, Congress and public as being your principal Deputy. Giving primacy to the CIA Deputy would generate one set of unavoidable problems; giving primacy to the Community Deputy (especially if -- under this arrangement -- he was a military officer) would generate another.

8. Conclusion. In sum, I believe strongly that the two-deputy approach is a loser, almost guaranteed to create more problems than it solves. Others (including Bill Colby) may and do disagree, but I am convinced that the present, rather easily modified framework offers a much more promising line of approach within which you can fairly easily solve the "CIA problem" without compounding and complicating the Community one.

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George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Economics

INFORMATION : NIO/USSR  
NIO/Middle East  
NIO/Japan  
NIO/Western Europe

SUBJECT : Economic Estimates

Attached is the memorandum from Secretary Simon via Mr. Morell that Mr. Bush mentioned at yesterday's meeting. After you have had an opportunity to peruse its contents, I would like to caucus with you to discuss what response should be provided the DCI for forwarding to Secretary Simon.



25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

Attachment

✓ D/NIO Chrono

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	S/MC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/IC				
9	D/DCI/NIO	X			
10	GC				
11	LC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19	EA/DCI		X		
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21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_ 25X1

Remarks:

To 9: Please develop reply and advise \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ about how long it will take.

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Executive Secretary

9 February 1976

Date



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

Executive Registry
76-838/1

February 5, 1976

Dear Mr. Bush:

I am enclosing a letter from Bill Simon on a subject that has interested him for some time. The letter, incidentally, covers one of the general topics he discussed with the President during the recent Saturday afternoon session with Cabinet officials on the organization and management of the intelligence community.

I am delighted that your confirmation worked out as well as it did. I'm looking forward to working with you in your efforts to put all of the pieces back together again--albeit in a somewhat different form. I do not underestimate the immensity of your task but I am confident that for the Agency and the intelligence community 1976 will end better than it began.

If you wish I would be happy to work with your staff in arranging a time for you and Bill to get together.

All the best for the future.

Sincerely,

*Bill*


William N. Morell, Jr.  
Treasury Representative on the  
United States Intelligence Board

The Honorable  
George Bush  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505



— THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY —

WASHINGTON 20220

CONFIDENTIAL

February 4, 1976

Dear George:

I have felt for some time that U.S. intelligence could take a more active role in preparing estimates of future developments important to our foreign economic policy. While I have found many national estimates helpful in providing background material relevant to our interests--particularly in the scientific, political and military fields--I have observed that these estimates rarely focus on important international economic issues. Although the various policy offices of the EPB departments and agencies will continue to do the lion's share of this work--with the help of contributions from your Office of Economic Research--I would hope that we could work together to strengthen the national estimates process in economic areas.

The trend of Soviet economic relations with Eastern Europe is an example of the type of estimate we might consider in view of the possibilities these trends may offer to the United States and the West for involving Eastern Europe more with the non-Communist world. While we obviously must be cautious and realistic in our expectations regarding these possibilities, they do seem worth exploring.

We have seen a number of recent developments in the pattern of Soviet economic ties with Eastern Europe which suggest that in coming years several Eastern European countries will have less assurance that they can depend on the Soviet Union as a major source of foodstuffs, energy and raw materials. For example, as a consequence of recent Soviet crop disasters Moscow

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CLASSIFIED BY W. N. Morell, Jr.  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
ON Dec. 31, 1982

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- 2 -

has told the Eastern European countries not to depend on the USSR for grain import needs during the 1975-76 period, stating flatly that they must fend for themselves. As you know, the Soviets also recently raised the price of oil and other raw materials to Eastern Europe, although not yet to the level of world prices. Thus, as these countries look to the future, they probably conclude that the Soviets will have continuing difficulty in meeting East Europe's future import needs.

On the export side East European industries have emphasized sales to the USSR. As they shift their purchases to other areas, the Eastern Europeans must find ways to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay for these imports by selling in hard currency markets, a difficult task since most of their current exports are not now attractive to Western buyers. Their trade must expand if these regimes in Eastern Europe are to achieve their modernization plans and meet the rising expectations of their citizenry. All of this presents a very real political and economic dilemma.

I believe it is important that we improve our perception of future prospects in this area and that we have a better understanding of the practical alternatives open to the countries of Eastern Europe. If the dilemmas described above develop, as we think they might, what trade and financing opportunities would the Eastern Europeans offer to the United States, other Western countries, Japan, and certain countries in the Middle East? What might the political and economic consequences be for our own interests if we were to more actively seek a strengthening of East Europe's economic relations with non-Communist countries? How might this best be done? Many other issues should be considered which have a bearing on our policy deliberations--issues which we would be happy to discuss with representatives of the intelligence community.


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- 3 -

If you agree that there is some merit in giving further consideration to the possibility of an estimate on this subject, please let me know. I hope, incidentally, that we can get together before long and discuss some of the more important aspects of intelligence support for foreign economic policy and negotiations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", is written over a horizontal line. Below the line, the name "William E. Simon" is printed in a serif font.

The Honorable  
George Bush  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

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25X1

10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : General Tighe's Request

1. On 9 February, the Acting Executive Secretary of the USIB sent you a note informing you that at the 10 February USIB meeting, General Tighe wants to bring up two additional items in executive session. With reference to one of these, [ ] reported that:

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[General Tighe] is going to request that DIA be given the lead on the study, "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems", because of the interaction with U.S. tactical reconnaissance. He indicated that the Chairman, JCS sees this as primarily a Defense problem.

2. The above statement almost certainly reflects some garble, either in Tighe's own mind or in the relay of his request. There is no study in train, or contemplated, on the "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems", although an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled "Soviet Dependence on Space Systems" was issued in November 1975. Tighe must have in mind the work being done on a related but significantly different subject, namely the interagency memorandum on "The Likelihood of Soviet Interference with U.S. Space Systems in Crises and Conflicts."

3. This study, which is in train, had its genesis last fall in a request from the Office of Management and Budget. The OMB noted that National Reconnaissance Program satellites and supporting systems were being justified in part on the basis of their potential utility in tactical conflicts. The OMB concluded that the vulnerability of our satellites was therefore pertinent to budget decisions about funding of NRP programs as well as tactical reconnaissance systems. OMB representatives expected that the findings of the study would justify either budget reductions in satellite systems if they were likely to be interfered with, or budget reductions in tactical reconnaissance systems if the satellites were judged reasonably secure. The study results may not meet these OMB expectations.

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\*4. Despite the flaws in OMB's reasoning, the subject is indeed of intrinsic importance and we did agree to take it on. During December and January a work plan was evolved under which the study would be produced on an interagency basis -- under the overall supervision of your NIO for Strategic Programs -- by an interagency task force chaired by [redacted] of CIA's Office of Strategic Research. Notice to that effect was circulated throughout the Community by two memoranda I signed on 16 January.

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5. What Tighe is actually requesting is a switch in procedures through which DIA would be given the lead in directing the actual work in lieu of CIA (OSR).

6. I think this would be a mistake primarily for two reasons:

a. The issues involved go far beyond military questions, no matter how broadly defined. They include considerations of Soviet attitudes, political perceptions, and political intentions and strategy. They do of course have military dimensions, but under the interagency plan already developed, military equities would be amply protected and the military establishment's professional expertise fully engaged by the degree of participation already requested of DIA, the service intelligence agencies and other Defense Department components.

b. Involved here is a very knotty problem which goes to the heart of your responsibilities and your retention of control over the mechanisms indispensable to their discharge. What we are talking about is national collection systems which are unquestionably national, even though they also (unquestionably) can and do provide information of an inordinate value to tactical commanders. The needs of the latter must clearly be served, but the allocation of priorities has to be left to the DCI to determine if his position as the government's principle intelligence officer is to retain substance and meaning. The difficulty is that in this instance (as in others), the old, tidy distinction between "national" and "tactical" intelligence/assets/systems has been overtaken by technology and is no longer as neat, or clear, as may have been the case a decade ago.

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7. The arrangements we have set up to do this study will keep it in proper focus and protect everyone's legitimate equities, including both yours and those of our colleagues in the Pentagon. I think they should be continued. At a minimum, however, I strongly recommend that you not acquiesce in General Tighe's proposal at the meeting and that, if you do not feel you want to turn him off there with a flat negative, you simply say you will look into the situation in response to his expression of concern, but do so in a manner that does not commit you to any final outcome or decision.

8. Appended for your information and background are copies of my two memoranda of 16 January (mentioned above), plus an informal note by [redacted] which develops the cogent reasons why supervision of this project belongs here and not in DIA. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

cc: DDCI  
DDI  
D/OSR  
DDS&T  
D/DCI/IC  
Executive Registry

Attachments

[redacted] 25X1

Copy No. 1 - DCI  
Copy No. 1a - EA/DCI  
Copy No. 2 - DDCI  
Copy No. 3 - DDI  
Copy No. 4 - D/OSR  
Copy No. 5 - DDS&T  
Copy No. 6 - D/DCI/IC  
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Copy No. 9 - D/NIO Chrono ✓  
Copy No. 10 - NIO/RI

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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SP - 4/76  
16 January 1976  
Copy 16

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward W. Proctor  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Mr. Carl E. Duckett  
Deputy Director for Science and Technology  
Mr. Harold H. Saunders  
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and  
Research, Department of State  
LTG Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF  
Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
LTG Lew Allen, Jr., USAF  
Director, National Security Agency  
Major General Harold R. Aaron  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army  
Rear Admiral B. R. Inman  
Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy  
Major General G. J. Keegan, Jr.  
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Air Force

SUBJECT : Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum  
on Likelihood of Soviet Interference with US Space  
Systems in Crises and Conflicts

1. In response to a request of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the DCI has approved the preparation of an interagency intelligence memorandum on the likelihood of Soviet interference with US military-support satellite systems. The purpose of the study is to assess whether, when, and how the USSR might use antisatellite systems or other means to interfere with the functioning of US satellite systems -- especially those reconnaissance systems associated with providing support to US military commanders in the field -- in crises or conflict situations. The time period to be addressed is about the next five years, and the US systems to be addressed are those presently operating and now programmed. The study will be prepared under aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs.

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WARNING NOTICE  
ALL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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2. Attached are draft terms of reference for the memorandum, as agreed between representatives of the OMB and NIO for Strategic Programs, in consultation with representatives of certain USIB agencies. The OMB has requested that a draft of an initial memorandum be available by 1 June 1976.

3. In the preparation of the memorandum, inputs will be needed on such subjects as US space systems (capabilities and vulnerabilities) and their tactical applications, Soviet antisatellite capabilities, Soviet space systems and Soviet dependency on them, Soviet conflict doctrine, and NATO-Warsaw Pact theater conflict scenarios. For some of these inputs, participation of the NRO will be required.

4. You are requested to designate a representative to serve on the ad hoc interagency group which will be responsible for preparing the memorandum [redacted]. The group will be chaired by [redacted] of the Office of Strategic Research, CIA. Please provide [redacted] with the name of your representative by COB Thursday, 22 January 1976. The first meeting of the ad hoc group will be held at CIA Headquarters, Room 5G00, 1000 hours on Friday, 23 January 1976.

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[redacted] 25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

## Attachment

cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)  
Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

- 2 -

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[Redacted]  
SP - 8/76  
16 January 1976  
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT : Request for NRO Participation in the Preparation of an  
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

1. The Director of Central Intelligence requests the participation of the National Reconnaissance Office in the preparation of an interagency intelligence memorandum on the likelihood of Soviet interference with US space systems in crises and conflicts (see attachment). The memorandum is to be produced in response to a request of the Office of Management and Budget.

2. Among the inputs needed for this project (see paragraph 3 of the attachment) are the capabilities and vulnerabilities of US space systems. In this connection, the assets of the NRO clearly are the most appropriate to draw upon. [Redacted] 25X1  
[Redacted] of your office recently participated in an interagency meeting on the OMB request and the outline for the memorandum.

3. You are requested to designate your point of contact for the ad hoc interagency group which will be responsible for preparing the memorandum. The group will be chaired by [Redacted] of the Office of Strategic Research, CIA. 25X1

[Redacted] 25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] 25X1

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WARNING: This document contains information on intelligence sources and methods involved

[Redacted] 25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : OSR/SEC Reaction to Recommendation  
on Leadership of Interagency Project  
"Prospects for Soviet Interference  
with US Space Reconnaissance Systems"

1. The impending proposal that DIA take the lead in this project leaves us with mixed feelings, on balance negative. The project is responsive both to requests from OMB and to the DCI's KIQ No. 8. OSR/SEC was assigned working-level leadership of this project as early as September 1975 because it, alone among many organizations in discussion with the NIO/SP and OMB, expressed both a willingness to commit resources to the effort and a belief that new work had to be done. Several months of initial data collection and problem formulation have been undertaken by OSR/SEC to date.

2. The prospect of shifting the assuredly heavy management and administrative (including security) burdens of this complex project to another agency is not unattractive to us. However, the putative reason to shift the leadership of the project to DIA -- because it concerns the interface of intelligence with tactical operations -- is not in itself persuasive.

3. The project certainly involves tactical intelligence functions of real-time systems. But it also involves problems of real-time political and strategic warning during the build-up of crises, a major CIA concern.

4. Tactical intelligence functions, by the very nature of evolving collection technologies and the great importance of the information they collect, are

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becoming increasingly difficult to carry out national intelligence functions. A most awkward precedent would be set if CIA were accorded a reduced role in this arena because it carries the term tactical.

5. OSR/SEC has asserted that the problem requires some unique conceptual and organizational approaches, combining space system expertise, appreciation of the battlefield, and knowledge of Soviet strategy and operations. During discussions of the problem, DIA was not notably vocal in expressing such recognition.

6. To date, DIA has not been visibly eager to put resources into this project, much less lead it. In response to our request for resource commitments to the project, DIA offered up one major as a contract officer, and two lesser officers as project participants.

7. It must be recognized that the purpose of the project is not to investigate the tactical role of real-time space reconnaissance assets per se, but rather to assess the incentives the Soviets will face to interfere in that role and how they might act on those incentives. It is not obvious that DIA is uniquely strong in this kind of analysis.

8. DIA's sudden interest in playing a leading role in this study is commendable in itself. But it probably derives from belated recognition that the results of the study could shape the views of national policymakers toward systems and programs in which the DOD has major interests. Insofar as the programs of central concern are in the NRP, CIA can be said to have less direct budgetary interest. But it is not clear that direct budgetary interests offer the best credentials for leadership of an intelligence study affecting those interests.

9. If successful in illuminating a complex and vital problem, the proposed study will have a direct effect on the resources and systems with which the DCI meets his future responsibilities in peace, crisis, and conflict. The principal question, then, is what combination of leadership and analytic resources gives the DCI the greatest confidence that the problem will be illuminated.

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Chief  
Strategic Evaluation Center

9 February 1976  
(1130 Hours)

NOTE FOR DCI


SUBJECT: USIB Executive Session

General Tighe just called to inform us that he intends to bring up two additional items in the USIB Executive Session tomorrow:

a. He is going to request that DIA be given the lead on the study, "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems", because of the interaction with U.S. tactical reconnaissance. He indicated that the Chairman, JCS sees this as primarily a Defense problem.

b. At the request of ASD(I), General Tighe is going to call for the importance of more collection against the Soviet navy. He said that this relates to the recent information on the Soviet navy mutiny. He indicated that Bill Nelson was aware of this problem.

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Acting Executive Secretary, USIB

cc:

D/DCI/IC

D/DCI/NIO ✓

DDI

DDO



National Intelligence Officers

9 February 1976

*D/n 10 Chrons*

Mr. Peter Rodman  
Office of the Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

Dear Peter:

Per our telephone conversation, attached is the picture. [redacted] is the fellow standing at the left side of the picture with pointer on his shoulder. He has done some work for (now) four DCIs and we will miss him when he retires in March. If Henry could spare fifteen seconds to inscribe this picture to [redacted] it would be greatly appreciated.

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Many thanks for your help.



25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

*cy:*



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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

7 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF  
Acting Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Electronic Warfare

1. Recently the Director of Central Intelligence requested that a National Intelligence Officer investigate the need for an Electronic Warfare study at the national level. In pursuit of this, the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces has consulted with various organizational groups in the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. As a result, it has become apparent that a study "ECM Capabilities - ECC" which has been produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency for some years is now under extensive revision. It is a Secret-level study with considerable detail and of significant utility to operational forces.

2. Because of its limited level of security, however, it can merely reflect, but cannot include, some of the more highly classified and high informative material now available. As a consequence, the study does not adequately fill the needs of policy level personnel in Washington. It is clear that an additional study better serving the immediate needs of Washington level consumers is needed. In order to accomplish this, it has been decided that the Defense Intelligence Study should continue on its schedule with no interference in its production. An additional interagency study should be produced which would reflect significant features of the DIA study plus "all source" material which can best illuminate Soviet electronic warfare doctrine, practice, and policy.

3. We have learned that the DIA Directorate of Science and Technology has recently created a section under the leadership of [redacted] to thoroughly handle

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electronic warfare aspects of the Soviet threat. Because of this, it is requested that [redacted] be designated to manage the national level study under the aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. It is further requested that the Colonel develop an outline of what would be needed for such a study and that this be submitted to the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces as soon as possible. Subsequent to this, the opinions of USIB representatives will be solicited, their suggestions considered, a production schedule set up and contributions requested.

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[redacted]  
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George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

GACarver, Jr., kj

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

6 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA  
Military Assistant to the Secretary  
of Defense

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support for General Haig

Forwarded herewith for your perusal and information  
is a further set of the cables sent [ ] in support of  
General Haig. Please return these and future messages to  
my office after they have served your purposes.

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*for* George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

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GACarver, Jr., kes  
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

5 February 1976

The Honorable Harold H. Saunders  
Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Hal,

I wanted to send a word of thanks for INR's institutional and your personal contributions to the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand issued on 4 February by the DCI. Your taking the time to annotate the draft and sharpen up its implications section was particularly helpful and very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,




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George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PC

National Intelligence Officers

5 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter  
Director  
Office of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : The 4 February Interagency Intelligence  
Memorandum on Thailand

1. As you know, on 4 February an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand -- prepared under the aegis of the NIO/SSEAAF -- was issued in the DCI's name. It was, I think, a very good paper.

2. As you doubtless also know, your colleagues did most of the work on this paper, including the bulk of the basic drafting. Would you please relay down your command chain my thanks and UNCODED for this typically first-class job done by the East Asia-Pacific Division and, particularly, those splendid analysts in its South-east Asian Branch. UNCODED deserves a special word of thanks for his work, though saying that is not to slight the contributions of UNCODED and all the other cooks who contributed seasoning to this broth.

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George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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NIO # 0194-76

5 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Interagency Intelligence Memorandum  
on Thailand

1. Attached is an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled "The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US", which was issued on 4 February.

2. Thai politics are now in a somewhat volatile and potentially turbulent period, with assorted coup rumors beginning to circulate. Though the latter, to date, appear somewhat ephemeral, none of us want to get caught short by any sudden change in the Thai scene, particularly during your first few weeks in office. Consequently, I wanted to get this memorandum out as quickly as possible and, hence, took the liberty of signing it for you so that it could be issued as soon as it was completed instead of holding it for a day until your return from New York.

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George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

cc: DDCI w/att  
Executive Registry w/att

GACarver, Jr./kes

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft  
Assistant to the President  
(National Security Affairs)

SUBJECT : The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US

1. The attached Interagency Intelligence Memorandum contains the intelligence community's assessment of how the present election campaign in Thailand will affect Thai-US relations and prospects for retention of a residual US military presence in Thailand.

2. As the memorandum indicates, there is a strong possibility that the Thai military may assume control of the government at some point before elections are held, or soon thereafter. Within the Thai military establishment, there is considerable nervousness, plus a growing disenchantment with Thailand's experiment with parliamentary government. Moreover, there are rivalries and crosscurrents within the military establishment which could result in one or another clique's attempting a preemptive coup against the presumed plans of some other group. In short, the situation in Thailand is fluid and subject to quick and dramatic change.

3. We gave serious consideration to issuing the attached study as an "Alert Memorandum." Our decision not to use that particular art form should not be misconstrued as a sign of complacency about the state of affairs in Thailand. We will, of course, keep a close eye on this situation and alert you promptly to any new developments giving further grounds for concern.

*for* George Bush

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Attachment

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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**Interagency  
Intelligence  
Memorandum**

*The Thai Election and  
Its Implications for the US*

**Secret**

NIO IIM 76-008  
February 1976

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February 4, 1976

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\*

SUBJECT: The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US

KEY POINTS

With elections scheduled for April, Thailand is experiencing a growing sense of malaise concerning the country's experiment with parliamentary democracy.

- This sentiment is expressed by King Phumiphon, the military, and many prominent civilian figures.

In these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that the military might decide to assume control. For the moment, the King appears to be against such a course, and many military leaders would be loathe to act against the King's wishes. The situation is fragile, however, and subject to quick change.

- Some younger officers are maneuvering to force their superiors to take a stand on the question of a military takeover.
- Given the rivalries within the military, it is also possible that one or another military leader might attempt a preemptive coup.

Other developments which would increase the likelihood of a coup are:

- a sharp deterioration of the security situation.
- a breakdown in public order caused by widespread strikes or anti-government disorders.
- the prospect of a left-of-center coalition coming to power which would threaten the vested interests of the military and conservative elements in Thailand.

---

\* This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

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Short of a coup, there is also a possibility that the elections may be postponed, leaving Khukrit, the present caretaker prime minister, to rule through emergency decree.

- Khukrit, the military, and the King may well come to prefer this alternative over going through with the elections.

Implications for the US during the election campaign

- By the 20 March deadline on removal of US combat forces, the US will probably be able to complete the negotiations now in train with the Khukrit government regarding the residual US military presence.
- But there is no assurance that an agreement signed by Khukrit will be honored by a new government.
- The election campaign probably will complicate Thai-US relations. The US presence is likely to become an issue in the campaign, and campaign pressures may force some candidates to insist on a total US military withdrawal.

Implications for the US after an election

- If an election is held, it would be likely to bring another centrist-conservative government into power.
  - Such a government would probably be as fragmented and contentious as the present government, but it would keep Thai policy toward the US more or less along present lines.
- A less likely possibility is either a coalition based exclusively on rightist elements, or one which included the Socialists.
  - A rightist government would be cooperative with US interests, but would still be restrained by political considerations on how far it could go, or appear to go, in accommodating the US.

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- A government in which the Socialists had a strong voice would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the US to maintain any military presence in Thailand. Such a government, however, could prompt the military either to force the government to resign or to overthrow it.

In the event of a military takeover, the resultant government would be sympathetic to US interests.

- It would be unlikely, however, to reverse the long term trend toward a more non-aligned Thai foreign policy. Nevertheless, a military government might call for a substantial increase in US assistance if faced with a greatly expanded insurgency or a breakdown of civil order in the country.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

4 February 1976

NOTE FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Senator Pell's Request

1. Per our 3 February session, attached is a memorandum outlining a set of talking points you may want to use in a private session with Senator Pell in response to the queries contained in his 23 January letter (a copy of which is also attached).

2. The attached memorandum is classified because the subject with which it deals is still considered classified. If you so desire,

a) it could be recast into a letter for the Senator, or

b) we could draft a formal reply to Senator Pell giving technically accurate answers to the two questions he actually asked (i.e., "no" and "no"), said reply to be amplified and explained by you in oral conversation, or

c) drawing on the attached, you can give him a candid oral reply in lieu of any formal written response to his 23 January letter.

(OVER)

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cc: DDCI

OLC

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Executive Registry

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3. Please let us know your preference on  
this matter.

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George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

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*Response for DCI signature  
ph.*

Executive Secretary

*26 Feb*  
Date

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*Subcommittee on  
Arms Control,  
International Security  
& Arms Control*

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ational Intelligence Officers

3 February 1976

NOTE FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Two Special Projects of the  
Former Office of the DCI's  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese  
Affairs

Per our conversation on 3 February,  
attached are resumes of the two special  
projects we discussed. Both of these  
resumes were prepared in 1973.

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George A. Carver, Jr.  
D/DCI/NIO

~~THE~~ DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

2 February 1976

Lieutenant General Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF  
Acting Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

*Copy to  
NIO/China  
please*



Dear Gene:

Thank you very much for making  25X1  
available to assist us in the development of NIE 13-3-76.  
He is clearly a member of the community best qualified to  
take on this task and we appreciate your letting him do it.

Sincerely yours,



25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

GACarver, Jr./kes

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

S-6013/DE-3

Mr. George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

28 JUN 80

Dear Mr. Carver:

(S) I am pleased to accept your recommendation that  of my Directorate for Estimates assist you in the development of NIE 13-3-76: "PRC Military Policy and General Purpose Forces" by serving as principal text manager and drafter. Despite other critical demands on our professional talent, for what you refer to as our "near term needs," DIA attaches a first priority to support of the national intelligence production effort. We welcome any opportunity to play a leading role in that effort, particularly in military or military-related subject areas.

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Sincerely,

*Gene*

E. F. TIGHE, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Acting Director

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FORM NO. 238 1 MAY 56		REPLACES FORM 35-1 WHICH IS OBSOLETE		DOCUMENT CONTROL (13-40) MFG 7-75	
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DATE OF DOC 13 Feb 76	DATE REC'D 13 Feb 76	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING	
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February 2, 1976

The Honorable Richard M. Helms  
American Ambassador  
American Embassy  
APO New York 09205

Dear Dick,

I apologize for the delay in answering your note of 15 December. Unfortunately, our records came up blank. I found myself stymied but (as always) reluctant to confess failure. The other day, I had the happy thought of calling Walt Rostow, who did not know the answer but said he would get it for me. Less than an hour later, I was called by the head of the LBJ Library, who informed me that the first "Wise Men" caucus on Vietnam was held on 2 November 1967. If he is accurate (and he insists that he was), your memory was exactly 26 days off, which is not bad considering all that has happened since then.

Actually, I have been meaning to write you a note for some time. Few things in the period of lunacy which seems to have afflicted this nation have irritated me more than the spiteful assaults on you, your achievements and your integrity. I find this utterly bewildering (as must you). Your record speaks for itself. Virtually your whole adult life has been devoted to the service of our country, with no other aim in mind save that. You have served it well and faithfully, with much skill and commendable success.

The current clique of carping pygmies ignore the fact that in the real world -- as opposed to the dream world some of your critics find more congenial -- one must act without the benefit of clairvoyance or the knowledge conferred by hindsight. They turn a blind eye to the pressures you were under. I do not know all that passed between you and President Johnson and President Nixon. (It was not my business then, nor is it now.) If you made tactical adjustments on lesser issues to preserve larger equities, I can only hope that if I am ever in a similar position, I will have the wisdom and courage to do the same.

I hope the tide of lunacy is now ebbing. Should, unhappily, it prove not yet to be at flood, I want you to know that there are few I have ever met whom I respect as much as you and none that I respect more. I was proud to serve with and under you, am proud to count you as a friend -- and have said so, and will say so to anyone who asks, under any circumstances.

Ruth joins me in warmest regards to you both.

As ever,



GACarver, Jr./kes

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